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A BSTRACT
Economic integration between the EU and the CEECs has proceeded at high speed over the
90’s, with the main channels of such integration being trade and FDI. Some authors believe
that the ‘commercial transition’ is now complete and that a new, deeper phase of integration
has started, with growing flows of FDI in the region. Following a gravity-type approach, in
this paper I tackle two difficult issues surrounding the EU-CEECs integration: has FDI in the
CEECs region substituted EU exports, therefore harming employment at home? Has FDI in
the CEECs region been redirected away from similarly attractive countries, such as Spain and
Portugal? By using a unique database on FDI broken down by country and by sector, which
allows more detailed qualifications than possible in previous work, the answers to these two
questions appear to be negative.
Keywords: Foreign Direct Investment, Economic integration, Gravity Model
JEL classification codes: F15, F21, F23.
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ECONOMIC INTEGRATION BETWEEN THE EU
AND THE CEECS: A SECTORAL STUDY
FRANCESCA DI MAURO
1. Introduction
The economic integration between the European Union (EU) and the Central and Eastern
European Countries (CEECs) has proceeded at high speed in the past eight to nine years. The
main channels of such integration have been trade and FDI flows. The EU share in CEECs
exports has in fact nowadays reached levels close to 60-70% for nearly all the ten candidate
countries (CCs)
1, showing that quickly after the collapse of Comecon a massive re-direction
of trade towards Western Europe has occurred in the CEECs. Similar figures have been
subsequently observed for FDI, whereby the main investors in these countries come from EU
member states, Germany in particular.
Economic integration especially between developed and emerging countries could therefore
be described as a sequence of events. In the first stages of integration trade appears as the
main channel, while subsequently FDI becomes more important. In fact, investing abroad
implies a certain long-term commitment for the investor, who is not willing to place his
money in an uncertain environment. Deeper integration between countries often means that
the emerging country exerts major efforts in reforming its economy, which in turn benefits
from foreign investment. At the same time though, deeper integration between countries may
create some fears at home; in the context of the EU-CCs relationship, the most frequent
complaints are twofold, and derive from the fear that either (i) increasing FDI becomes a
substitute for EU exports to the CCs, harming therefore the (employment of the) exporting
sector at home, or (ii) FDI to the CEECs may displace FDI going to previous partners, e.g.
Spain or Portugal.
The objective of this paper is precisely to look at these two issues in detail, given their
importance for the accession debate. Previous work (Brenton and Di Mauro (1999) and
Brenton, Di Mauro and Lücke (1999)) on these issues has focused on aggregate data (for both
exports and FDI), by using estimations of gravity-type equations. The contribution of this
paper is to use a unique sectoral database, available for Germany on a relatively long term
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basis, that will allow us to detect differences between sectors and to identify which sectors are
particularly attractive in the CCs. The methodological tool used throughout the paper is the
gravity model, largely and successfully used for trade flows in the past. However, following
the work of Brainard (1993), the gravity approach has also expanded to FDI analysis, giving
satisfactory results.
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 illustrates some stylised facts on FDI in the CCs
and introduces the issues at stake. Section 3 sets out the theoretical framework for the gravity
model, while Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
2. Stylised facts
Since the opening-up of their economies, the CCs have increasingly redirected their exports
towards the EU, away from their previous Comecon partners. Several authors now believe
that the ‘commercial transition’ is now complete (Brenton and Gros (1997)) and that a new,
deeper phase of integration has started, with growing flows of FDI in the CCs. As can be seen
from Figure 1, these countries have witnessed an increase in both their absolute value of
inward FDI flows and in their world share.
Figure 1: FDI inflows (LH scale) and share in world 
inflows (RH scale)
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
19921993 1994 19951996 1997 19981999
m
i
o
 
$
0
.
0
%
1
.
0
%
2
.
0
%
3
.
0
%
4
.
0
%
T
o
t
 
1
0
 
C
C
s
%
 
o
f
 
w
o
r
l
d
 
i
n
f
l
o
w
s
Source: World Investment Report (2000), UNCTAD.
In terms of FDI per capita (see Figure 2), a measure of the growing importance of FDI in
these economies, we observe for example that the figures for the Czech Republic, Estonia,
Hungary and Lithuania are already greater than those for Portugal, and even higher than those
for Spain, in the case of Estonia.3
Figure 2: FDI inflows per capita - 1998 (US$)
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At the sectoral level, data are available for the period 1987-1996 for the ten EU candidates for
accession. On average, FDI in manufacturing accounts for 63% of total inflows, while 36% is
in services; Figure 3 shows the breakdown within manufacturing. These averages hide large
differences across countries. For example, FDI in the food sector represents 80% in Bulgaria
and 59% in Latvia, while motor-vehicles gets 45% of total in Czech Republic; Slovakia and
Slovenia are particularly attractive for the chemical sector, with 46% and 53% of total FDI
respectively. Recent figures display a shift towards more investment in services, probably
because of efficiency gains in manufacturing.
Figure 3: Sectoral breakdown of FDI cumulative 
flows within manufacturing (1986-1997)
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In terms of the home countries concerned, the EU accounts for nearly 80% of total FDI in theFRANCESCA DI MAURO
4
CCs region; within the EU, Germany’s role is predominant, with 43% of total. This
predominance of EU countries further explains the potential fears about FDI substituting EU
exports or FDI being redirected away from Southern European countries, often heard in
Europe. In the ‘substitution’ issue, similarly to the case of American workers perceiving a
jobs threat from Mexican ‘maquiladoras’, upon creation of NAFTA, EU workers started to
fear it from CCs’ workers, upon greater economic integration between the two regions. In
terms of employment, the channel through which the labour market can be affected is two-
fold and it is linked to the nature of FDI. On the one hand, when a firm establishes a plant
abroad and produces directly in the host market rather than exporting (market-seeking FDI),
the export sector at home may contract, with some domestic plants closing down and
unemployment rising, if the labour market suffers from rigidities and wages do not adjust
consequently. This would be the case with horizontal FDI. On the other hand, when a firm
produces abroad in order to take advantage of cheaper labour and export back home
(efficiency-seeking FDI), as in the case of vertical FDI, domestic workers may again be left
worse-off, especially the unskilled ones, since they are the direct competitors of cheaper
unskilled labour abroad. Nevertheless, in both cases we have at least to take into account the
effect of intra-firm trade, e.g. in capital or intermediate goods, from the parent firm to the
affiliate, since this can fuel demand for labour in the home economy, and therefore offset the
negative impact on the final good sector. The net effect is uncertain though, and the issue then
becomes an empirical matter.
The second concern about deeper integration between the EU and the CCs is related to the
issue of ‘redirection’. Has FDI to CCs been redirected away from Member States similarly
attractive, e.g. Spain and Portugal? The evolution of shares of German FDI tells us that while
for Czech Republic and Hungary they went from 0.5% to around 1.3% between 1992 and
1997, they decreased from 4.9% to 3.2% for Spain, while they stayed constant for Portugal.
However, one cannot conclude from that that a redirection has taken place. Maybe their initial
high shares of FDI just had to close the gap with respect to other EU member States at a
higher level of development. In any case, and for both issues, what is needed is a theoretical
model that can take into account the determinants of FDI, and from which one can derive
sensible estimates for various countries, given their level of development. Only then, one can
attempt to find causalities and relationships in what is observable with simple data. The next
section therefore introduces the gravity model, the tool that I will use to carry out such
investigations.5
3. From theory to practice: the gravity model
  The traditional theory of FDI tries to explain why firms produce abroad instead of simply
servicing the markets via exports. After all, multinational companies (MNCs) experience
additional costs in producing abroad: higher costs in placing personnel abroad,
communication costs, language and cultural differences, informational costs on local tax laws
and regulations, costs of being outside domestic networks; they also incur higher risks, such
as the risks of exchange rate changes or even of expropriation by the host country. One
theoretical approach, introduced by Dunning (1977, 1981), the “OLI framework”, considers
FDI as determined by Ownership, Location and Internalisation advantages which the MNC
holds over the foreign producer; when these advantages outweigh the above costs, FDI arises.
The so-called “New Theory of FDI” takes inspiration from the OLI approach and refers
mainly to the Ownership and Location advantage to introduce MNCs in general equilibrium
models, where they arise endogenously. The early literature (Helpman 1984, Helpman and
Krugman 1985) was mainly able to explain ‘vertical FDI’, i.e. investment that takes place in
order to take advantage of differences in relative factor endowments (hence in factor prices)
across countries. Instead, what is observed among developed countries is mainly ‘horizontal’
FDI, because similar types of production activities, owned by MNCs, take place in different
countries. This phenomenon is better clarified if multinational activity is not driven by factor
endowments differences, but rather by the trade-off between proximity and concentration
(Brainard 1993), which constitutes the starting point of the more recent literature. The
proximity advantage stems from ‘firm-level’ economies of scale, whereby R&D activity (or
any other type of ‘knowledge capital’) is transferable to affiliates and allows MNCs to be
closer to the foreign market. The concentration advantage derives from traditional ‘plant-
level’ economies of scale, which make it more profitable to concentrate production in one
location and then export. Whenever the former outweigh the latter, foreign investment will
take place, and this will be more likely the higher are intangible assets relative to fixed costs
of opening up an affiliate and the higher are transport costs, which are assumed to be positive
and an increasing function of geographical distance in this model. This allows for horizontal
FDI, where two-way investment between similar countries occurs, both in terms of absolute
and relative factor endowment.
  When we get to the empirical analysis, and we want to be able to compare ‘attractiveness’
across countries and explain the geographic distribution of FDI we need a model that can pick
up its common determinants. In order to synthesise the two approaches discussed above, i.e.FRANCESCA DI MAURO
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Helpman and Krugman’s treatment of vertical FDI and Brainard’s horizontal one, I will
include in the model the following variables
2: relative factor endowments, an index of
countries’ similarity in size, geographic distance between the partner countries and a measure
of the ‘economic space’ between the two countries, given by the sum of the two GDPs. The
last variable is included to catch the ‘market-seeking’ aspect of FDI, i.e. when investors
produce abroad to sell in the host market and increase their market shares there. Additional
variables, such as a common language, a common border, or preferential trade agreements,
that may reduce the costs of locating abroad, can be introduced via dummy variables. This
specification can easily be recognised as the ‘gravity model’. In contrast to the common view
among economists, the gravity model rests on a sound theoretical basis. Maurel (1998) carries
out a thorough investigation of its origins, and shows its evolution across the trade theories of
Linnemann (1966), Helpman and Krugman (1985) and the empirical studies by Helpman
(1987) and Brainard (1993). She also shows how the gravity model applied to trade can be
compatible with both the traditional Heckscher-Ohlin and the Helpman and Krugman
framework, without becoming a meaningless black box. Given the similarity between trade
and FDI in terms of trends, it has also been employed to estimate bilateral FDI flows (see
Brenton (1996), Eaton and Tamura (1996), and Brenton and Di Mauro (1999)). The variables
specified above are therefore also valid for a gravity equation applied to exports, something,
which will be done later in the paper, in Section 4.2. The general form of the gravity equation
that I estimate is the following:
  ￿ + + + + + + = ij kij k ij ij ij ij ij D Dist RELENDOW SIMILSIZE SUMGDP Y e g b b b b a ln ln 4 3 2 1 (1)
  with the following variable definitions: Y ij is the value of FDI or exports from country i
(home country) to country j (host country);
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2 A similar version of this model specification was first introduced by Helpman (1987) for a trade equation; more
recently, Egger (2000) has applied a refined version of it to both exports and FDI data.7
  Distij is the distance between countries i and j, D kij are dummy variables (mostly country
dummies) used when appropriate.
  The ‘economic space’ variable (SUMGDP) is expected to have a positive impact in both the
FDI and exports equation. The index of size similarity (SIMILSIZE) takes values between -¥
(i.e. the log of a number near zero) in case of perfect dissimilarity and -0.69 (the log of 0.5)
for perfect similarity. Similarity in size should have a positive effect on exports: countries
similar in size will trade more, as the Helpman and Krugman theory of increasing returns
predicts, trade is of intra-industry nature. I also expect a positive coefficient in the FDI
equation, if the New FDI Theory holds true, as those models were motivated by the
observation that FDI arises more among similar countries.
  Differences in relative endowments (RELENDOW) are measured here by the absolute
difference in GDP per capita
3; one could question the validity of this proxy, since, as noted in
Helpman (1987), this method is accurate when there are only two factors of production
(capital and labour) and all goods are freely traded. Better measures would be: GDP per
worker, the ratio of capital (gross fixed capital formation) over working population, or that of
skilled workers in total employment, as advocated by Wood (1994) for assessing the factor
content of trade. I foresee undertaking such refinements in the construction of this variable in
the future
4. As far as the impact is concerned, a negative coefficient in the exports equation is
a sign that Helpman and Krugman’s theory of intra-industry trade (IIT) prevails: trade is not
determined by differences in factor composition, as foreseen by traditional Heckscher-Ohlin
inter-industry type trade models. For FDI, the story is similar: vertical FDI (equivalent to
inter-industry trade) emerges as countries greatly differ in their factor composition – hence
showing a positive coefficient, while horizontal FDI (comparable to IIT) is determined by
similarity in factor composition, therefore displaying a negative coefficient. One cannot know
a-priori, which type prevails and the answer is an empirical one.
  As for distance, the effect on exports is clearly negative, being it a proxy for transport costs.
On the other hand, FDI theory suggests that firms will invest abroad rather than export
provided that trade costs are high. However, this variable may also have a negative coefficient
in the FDI equation since the costs of operating overseas affiliates are still likely to rise the
                                                
3 Measuring in terms of the simple difference does not change the results.
4 Preliminary results (available on request) using the GDP per worker definition of factor endowments do not
differ substantially from those with the GDP per capita one.FRANCESCA DI MAURO
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further they are from the MNCs headquarters. Overall though, I expect the coefficient in the
exports equation to be higher than that in the FDI equation.
Empirical studies of trade using the gravity model have been widely undertaken and they
usually explain a high proportion of the variance. However, the standard error of the
estimated equation being always high, it suggests some caution in interpreting the results.
Moreover, misspecifications in the gravity equation are not excluded either, as pointed out by
Polak (1996) and Matyas (1997), but if a proper specification of the model is ensured, it
seems that the gravity equation represents a good way to proceed empirically when trying to
explain the geographical distribution of FDI.
4. Empirical analysis
Before addressing the two main issues of the paper (i.e. ‘substitution/complementarity’
between exports and FDI and FDI ‘redirection’), the empirical analysis will begin by
delivering a detailed picture of the most attractive sectors in the CCs for German investors.
The database that I use (published by the Deutsche Bundesbank) gives a unique breakdown of
German FDI stock both by destination country and by sector, in approximately 30 countries
per year and in nine ‘macro-sectors’. Data are available from 1985, but I decided to start my
analysis in 1992, given that FDI was practically non-existent in the CCs before that date, and
end it in 1997. The host countries for German FDI (see the Annex for a detailed list) include
EU member states, US, Canada and Japan, various developing countries and three of the CCs
(Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland); unfortunately no data are available for the other
seven. Nevertheless, these three countries represent on average about 80% of total FDI
received by the CCs over the period 1992-1999.
The sectors available in the database include both manufacturing and services (according to
the NACE Rev. 1 classification); in particular, for the former I have: chemicals, machinery,
electrical machinery, motor vehicles; for the latter: distributive trade, monetary
intermediation, other financial institutions, insurance and holdings. Even though the sectoral
breakdown is not very disaggregated, these nine sectors account on average for 89% of total
FDI, over the period 1992-1997. One can therefore be confident that the overall picture of
German FDI is relatively close to reality. The database therefore includes three dimensions:
time (six years from 1992 to 1997), sectoral (nine sectors) and geographical (at most 32
destination countries); this richness is best exploited by panel data analysis, the estimation9
technique used here
5. Were the panel balanced, the database should contain 6 x 9 x 32= 1728
observations, but due to missing countries in some years, the available number of
observations is 1411.
My main interest lies in the sectoral dimension of the data, i.e. I first want to detect which are
the most attractive sectors for German investors in general, and then assess (via country
dummies) the specificity of the CC3 considered (Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland), as
well as other country groups
6. For the general equation I therefore choose to introduce
sectoral dummy variables and estimate it as a Fixed Effect Model (FEM). Subsequent
equations also include country dummies interacted with sectoral dummies, in a way that will
become clear in the next sections of the paper.
The gravity equation that I specify in each following sub-section can in general be described
as follows:
ijkt hij h k ij ijt ijt ijt ijkt D time Dist RELENDOW SIMILSIZE SUMGDP Y e g d b b b b b a + + + + + + + + = ￿ 5 4 3 2 1 ln ln (5)
  where Y ijkt is the value of FDI or export from country i (home country) to country j (host
country) in sector k in year t, and where I have added a time trend (time), sectoral fixed
effects (dk) and the usual error term; the other variables are those described in Section 3.
4.1  Sectoral distribution of German FDI in the CC3
This sub-section is designed to give a detailed idea of which sectors are most attractive in the
three CCs considered (named CC3), once the common determinants of FDI are taken into
account. As mentioned before, the methodology here is the following: I estimate a gravity
equation for German FDI stocks over the period 1992-1997, with sectoral dummies and with
specific CC3-sectoral dummies. I also include in my equation an EU sectoral dummy, in order
to take into account the deeper integration already in place between Germany and the other
EU countries.
A first specification of equation (5) is to look at the simple breakdown between
manufacturing and services, by aggregating data on the four manufacturing and the five
services sectors. This will already qualify the type of FDI in the CC3. Table 1 shows the
estimation results, where ‘services’ serves as the baseline sector.
                                                
5 Heteroscedasticity problems in the data are tackled directly throughout the analysis, either by calculating robust
standard errors or by using the feasible GLS estimator.
6 An F-test on the hypothesis that these three countries can be considered jointly cannot be rejected at the 4.7%
confidence level.FRANCESCA DI MAURO
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The gravity variables all have the expected sign: increased ‘economic space’ (SUMGDP) has
a noticeable impact on FDI and a positive coefficient is also found for the size similarity
variable. Overall, differences in relative factor endowments have a negative impact on FDI;
from the theoretical discussion above one can infer that on average, German investors are in
general more prone to horizontal than vertical FDI. Finally, distance appears to harm FDI too,
something, which is more intuitive in the case of exports.
Looking at the coefficients of the dummy variables, the first observation is that FDI in
manufacturing appears to be nearly twice as large as in services (exponent of 0.6391).
However, the opposite is true for EU countries, where investment in services becomes the
prevalent one, while FDI in manufacturing within EU countries is not greater than that
observed at a world level. This observation is somehow reversed for the CC3, where, when
Germans invest in the CC3, they will tend to do in the manufacturing sector, on average twice
as much (exponent of 0.6279) than in any other country of those included. In contrast, FDI in
services in the CC3 does not appear to show any specificity.
Table 1: Two-sector breakdown
(White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance)
Dep. Var.: LFDI Coefficient Robust
Std. Error
t-Statistic
SUMGDP 1.8470 0.1943 9.5080
SIMILSIZE 0.4040 0.0974 4.1480
RELENDOW -0.3731 0.0873 -4.2740
DIST -0.2842 0.0699 -4.0670
EUMANUF -0.1391 0.1912 -0.7280
EUSERVICES 1.0856 0.2396 4.5310
CC3MANUF 0.6279 0.2770 2.2670
CC3SERVICES 0.0096 0.3579 0.0270
MANUFACT 0.6391 0.1591 4.0180
TIME 0.0593 0.0328 1.8090
_cons -135.6831 64.9391 -2.0890
N. of observations 371
Adjusted R-squared 0.5622
S.E. of regression 1.0440
F-statistic 63.15
Prob > F 0.0000
In further analysis (not shown here) I also interacted the CC3 dummy with the three ‘core’11
gravity variables SUMGDP, SIMILSIZE and RELENDOW. These interaction terms are
never significant, hence revealing that the core determinants of German investors in the CC3
do not deviate from those of other potential host countries.
I can now investigate in more detail the relative attractiveness of the various sectors, by
including sectoral, as well as crossed country/sectors dummies. The results of the regressions
are reported in Table 2, where the chosen baseline sector is ‘machinery’ (again, coefficients
on the dummies should be read as deviations from this sector). The first comment concerns
the general sectoral dummies: here again I find a similar picture as in Table 1. Manufacturing
sectors all show a significant and positive coefficient (except for motor vehicles), while
services have a negative one, the only exception being distributive trade, with a positive and
significant coefficient. Secondly, the EU sectoral dummies confirm what was found before,
namely that FDI in the EU is predominantly in services, ranging from 3 times (in the case of
‘insurance’) to nearly 15 times (for ‘other financial institutions’) more than in any other
country on average. Thirdly, in the CC3, I see that the leading sector in manufacturing is
‘motor vehicles’, where FDI is 7 times higher than in the other manufacturing sectors
(exponent of 1.9985). More surprisingly, I find that monetary intermediation plays an
important role in the CC3 (nearly 8 times higher), while FDI in holdings is clearly below the
other countries’ average.
An explanation of the monetary intermediation performance could come from forward and
backward linkages phenomena: German firms establishing in the CC3, e.g. in the motor-
vehicle sector, also provide an incentive to their bankers, with whom they have a backward
linkage in terms of credit supply, to follow them abroad and open up a branch in the same
destination countries. This explanation is even more realistic as financial markets in transition
countries are not perceived as the most complete.
Over the period 1992-1997, I can therefore conclude that German FDI in the CC3 has been
driven mainly by the manufacturing sector, and by the production of motor vehicles in
particular. This occurred in contrast to the EU trend, where German FDI was much more
concentrated in services.
Table 2: Sectorial analysis (Cross-sectional time-series FGLS regression)
Dep. Var.: LFDI Coefficient Std. Err. z
SUMGDP 1.5460 0.1435 10.7750FRANCESCA DI MAURO
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SIMILSIZ 0.6610 0.0597 11.0620
RELENDOW -0.3756 0.0483 -7.7760
DIST -0.2361 0.0442 -5.3420
CC3CHEM -0.2653 0.4297 -0.6170
CC3MACHI 0.2987 0.3583 0.8340
CC3MOTOR 1.9985 0.6204 3.2210
CC3ELECT 0.4080 0.3776 1.0810
CC3DISTR 0.7747 0.2734 2.8340
CC3MONET 2.0494 0.7010 2.9230
CC3OTHER -0.5564 0.9655 -0.5760
CC3INSUR 0.2700 0.6951 0.3880
CC3HOLDI -1.7551 0.9568 -1.8340
CHEMICAL 1.3493 0.1889 7.1430
MOTORVEH 0.2137 0.2662 0.8030
ELECTRMA 0.7726 0.1748 4.4210
DISTRIBT 1.4226 0.1462 9.7280
MONETINT -0.4114 0.3184 -1.2920
OTHERFIN -1.5880 0.3181 -4.9920
INSURANC -0.5984 0.2916 -2.0520
HOLDINGS -1.7461 0.3004 -5.8130
EUCHEM -0.3167 0.2449 -1.2930
EUMACHIN 0.1755 0.2122 0.8270
EUMOTOR 0.1014 0.4052 0.2500
EUELECTR 0.0884 0.2257 0.3920
EUDISTRI 0.4257 0.1593 2.6730
EUMONET 1.8268 0.4479 4.0790
EUOTHERF 2.6914 0.4605 5.8450
EUINSURA 1.0938 0.3842 2.8470
EUHOLDIN 1.7122 0.4362 3.9250
TIME 0.0706 0.0228 3.0930
_cons -155.7856 45.1092 -3.4540
N. of observations 1411
Wald chi²(31) 1453.34
Pr > chi² 0.000013
4.2  FDI and exports: complements or substitutes?
As already mentioned at the beginning of the paper, closer economic integration between
countries – especially through FDI – may cause fears in terms of ‘job loss’ in the home
(investor) country. It is therefore the relationship between FDI and employment at home that
ought to be analysed, if one wants to draw conclusions on the impact of ‘globalisation’. Two
approaches have been followed in the literature until now to tackle this issue: a direct
approach and an indirect one. The former usually consists in estimating simple regressions
equations of the demand for labour of home-country parent firms, as a function of affiliates
net sales (which proxy their production). This implies the necessity to use data on activities of
foreign affiliates, which can be done in a consistent way only for the U.S. and Sweden, two
countries with such data (see for example Blomström et al. (1997) and Brainard and Riker
(1997)). The results usually show a very low substitution between employment at home and
in the affiliates.
The indirect way to empirically test the impact of FDI on employment is to look at the
relationship between exports and FDI. Here the objective is to see whether FDI substitutes for
exports, and therefore indirectly harms the exporting sector’s employment at home. The
methodology that I adopt takes inspiration from the work of Graham (1996). Two gravity
equations are estimated, one for exports and one for FDI at a sectoral level, and then the
residuals of the estimation are regressed against each other. The presumption of this method is
to remove the influence of the common factors on FDI and on exports, by using gravity
equations. A positive correlation between the two residuals is therefore interpreted as a sign of
complementarity, since high residuals in exports are associated with high residuals in FDI,
and vice-versa. This method is intended only to give a first indication about the relationship
between exports and FDI, and should be viewed as a starting point for further analysis.
In my sectoral case, I faced some problems in finding comparable trade data on services;
therefore I decided to conduct the analysis only for the four manufacturing sectors, i.e. to
estimate exports and FDI equations for ‘chemicals’, ‘machinery’, ‘motor vehicles’ and
‘electrical machinery’ (which explains the reduced sample size – 669 observations). In order
to pick up the differentiated sectoral effect for the CC3, I included in the residuals regression
the CC3 sectoral dummies. The results in Table 3 show a positive and significant coefficient
for the general export residual (RESEXP), hence a sign of complementarity between exports
and FDI. At the same time, the specific sectoral impact for the CC3 does not significantlyFRANCESCA DI MAURO
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deviate from this general result. Moreover, a significant complementarity relationship is
detected for ‘electrical machinery’ in the CC3.
One other method has also been tried, and it gives the same results (available upon request): I
run a SURE regression with the FDI and the exports equations, and then look at the
correlation matrix of the residuals. The positive coefficient found fails to pass a Breusch-
Pagan test of independence, hence suggesting a sign of complementarity.
Table 3: Complementarity vs. substitutability (OLS)
Dep. Var.: resfdi Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic
Resexp 0.6090 0.0950 6.4110
rxcc3chemicals -0.3546 0.3453 -1.0270
rxcc3machinery -0.0774 0.2501 -0.3090
rxcc3motorvehicles -0.1453 0.1447 -1.0040
rxcc3electrical 0.3363 0.1700 1.9790
_cons 0.0003 0.0534 0.0050
N. of observations 669 R-squared 0.0678
Adjusted R-squared 0.0608 F(5, 663) 9.64
Root MSE 1.3823 Prob > F 0.0000
Previous conclusions on this issue at an aggregate level (Brenton, Di Mauro and Lücke
(1998)) are therefore confirmed at this, albeit limited, sectoral dimension. Exports and FDI
seem in general to go hand in hand for German investors, and this is also true for the CC3.
4.3  FDI redirection: a myth?
Does economic integration between two countries or regions affect the amount of FDI being
invested in third countries? The experiences of Spain and Portugal, upon joining the EU, and
Mexico, following the decision to negotiate NAFTA, suggest that joining a regional economic
integration scheme can provide an impetus to inward FDI. This raises the question of whether
these increases in incoming FDI affected the flows of direct investment going to other
potential host countries that did not offer the advantage of belonging to the regional
integration scheme concerned. Baldwin et al. (1995) suggest that the creation of the Single
Market in the EU “probably led to investment diversion in the economies of the European
Free Trade Association (EFTA) and investment creation in the EU economies”, the latter
being particularly prevalent in Spain and Portugal. This may, in turn, have encouraged these15
countries to seek access to the Single Market via the European Economic Area, and
subsequently to request membership of the EU itself.
This issue of a potential redirection of FDI from Southern European countries will be treated
by comparing the amount of FDI received by the two groups of countries, still within the
gravity approach, and by including the sectoral dimension. This will enable us to check in
which sectors there has been (or not) a redirection of FDI from Spain and Portugal towards
the CC3. In particular, I use the gravity model to look at the evolution over time of the
bilateral distribution of German FDI and assess whether the increased FDI from Germany to
the CC3, in the aftermath of their liberalisation in the 1990s, had any noticeable impact upon
foreign investments by Germany in Portugal and Spain.
My methodological approach is based upon that of Sapir (1997) who sought to identify
whether a domino effect had characterised the impact of European integration upon bilateral
trade flows. A gravity equation is estimated for FDI, by including country and sectoral
dummies for three groups of partners of German investors: the CC3, Spain and Portugal (EP)
and the remaining EU countries. The results are presented in Table 4. One can observe some
common features of EP and the CC3: both groups of countries seem to have their strength
point in ‘motor-vehicles’ and in ‘distribution’, while the least attractive sector is the same too:
‘holdings’. These results could be interpreted as a first sign of ‘competition’ between the two
groups of countries, since they appear to have the same structure of ‘attractiveness’ across
sectors.
Nevertheless, these tentative results are based on the whole period considered (1992 to 1997).
In order to detect potential breaks in the series, I therefore decided to conduct the regressions
by splitting the period in two equal sub-periods: 1992-1994 and 1995-1997. These also
represent two phases of the CC3 integration: a mere economic integration, with the signature
of the Europe Agreements in the first period, while the second one benefited from a speeding-
up process for accession, launched during the European Summits of Essen in December 1994
(creation of the Phare programme) and Madrid in December 1995 (opening-up of the
negotiations). This allows us to better identify the temporal pattern of any change in German
investors’ taste in terms of host countries. In order to facilitate the interpretation of the
regression results (not fully reported here, but available on request) I give a graphical
representation sector by sector (see Figures 1 to 9). As in the case of Table 4, I include in the
regression  dummy variables  for  the CC3, EP  (Spain and Portugal)  and  the remaining  EUFRANCESCA DI MAURO
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Table 4. FDI redirection
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic
SUMGDP 1.5324 0.1413 10.8450
SIMILSIZ 0.6829 0.0589 11.5840
RENDOW1 -0.3703 0.0476 -7.7840
DIST -0.2422 0.0448 -5.4050
CC3CHEM -0.2574 0.4197 -0.6130
CC3MACHI 0.3059 0.3546 0.8630
CC3MOTOR 2.0094 0.5966 3.3680
CC3ELECT 0.4157 0.3679 1.1300
CC3DISTR 0.7815 0.2734 2.8590
CC3MONET 2.0531 0.7027 2.9220
CC3OTHER -0.5494 0.9035 -0.6080
CC3INSUR 0.2777 0.6899 0.4020
CC3HOLDI -1.7444 0.8861 -1.9690
EPCHEM 0.3377 0.4255 0.7940
EPMACHIN 0.4749 0.3615 1.3140
EPMOTOR 1.9980 0.6855 2.9150
EPELECT 1.0019 0.3765 2.6610
EPDISTR 0.5366 0.2717 1.9750
EPMONET 1.0290 0.9962 1.0330
EPOTHERF -0.3619 0.7748 -0.4670
EPINSURE -0.0153 0.6763 -0.0230
EPHOLDIN -1.8266 0.7574 -2.4120
CHEMICAL 1.3488 0.1850 7.2910
MOTORVEH 0.2101 0.2570 0.8170
ELECTRMA 0.7722 0.1709 4.5170
DISTRIBT 1.4231 0.1450 9.8120
MONETINT -0.4085 0.3186 -1.2820
OTHERFIN -1.5870 0.2997 -5.2950
INSURANC -0.5986 0.2891 -2.0710
HOLDINGS -1.7450 0.2807 -6.2160
EU10CHEM -0.4742 0.2565 -1.8490
EU10MACH 0.0894 0.2274 0.3930
EU10MOTO -0.4613 0.4251 -1.0850
EU10ELEC -0.1686 0.2393 -0.7040
EU10DIST 0.3963 0.1708 2.3200
EU10MONE 1.9192 0.4658 4.1200
EU10OFIN 3.4272 0.4619 7.4200
EU10INSU 1.3206 0.4024 3.2820
EU10HOLD 2.4641 0.4307 5.7210
TIME 0.0708 0.0225 3.1540
_cons -155.9214 44.3771 -3.5140
N. of observations 1411 Wald chi²(40) 1606.18
Pr > chi² 0.000017
countries, for each of the two sub-periods (labelled P1 and P2 in the figures). The graphs only
show the value of these country dummies. The way to read the graphs is the following: the
height of the histogram bar in each case shows the magnitude of the coefficient on the
dummy, whilst the small circles above and below show the relevant (5 per cent) confidence
interval. Thus, if the bar lies outside of the relevant upper or lower circle, then the estimated
coefficient is statistically significant.
A general comment on the results is that all the standard gravity variables have the expected
sign. By looking at the relative magnitudes of the dummy variables coefficients, one can
notice three phenomena: some dummies stay the same over the two periods (e.g. EPmotor,
EU10holdings), some others increase from one period to the next (as in CC3monet,
CC3holdings – from clearly negative to zero – EPholdings and EU10otherfin) and finally in
four sectors one can observe a reduction in the value of the coefficient over the two periods
(CC3motor, EU10monet, EU10insure and EU10holdings). The last phenomenon tells us
something about the integration process within the EU: the FDI surge in services has mainly
occurred in the period 1992-95, i.e. following the completion of the Single Market
Programme. Moreover, the emergence of FDI in the motorvehicle sector in the CC3 mainly
took place in the initial phases of integration between the two areas; this can be tentatively
explained by the presence of ‘first-mover advantages’ in an oligopolistic sector such as the
motorvehicle one and the fact that German firms were (geographically) well placed to take
full advantage of it. This ‘move’, however, does not seem to have happened at the expense of
Spain and Portugal, given the results on the EPmotor dummy. Finally, some of the dummies
on the services sectors in EP and CC3 have picked up in the second period, hence showing a
trend towards a catching up process with the European trend.Fig.1: chemicals
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Fig.3: motorvehicles
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Fig.4: electrical machinery
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Fig. 5: distributive trade
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Fig. 6: monetary intermediation
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Fig. 7: other financial intermediation
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Fig. 8: insurance
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Fig. 9: holdings
-3.0
-2.0
-1.0
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
CC3HOLDINGSP1
CC3HOLDINGSP2
EPHOLDINGSP1
EPHOLDINGSP2
EUHOLDINGSP1
EUHOLDINGSP219
5. Concluding remarks
Following a gravity-type approach, in this paper I have tried to tackle two difficult issues
surrounding the EU-CEECs integration: has FDI in the CEECs region substituted EU exports,
therefore harming employment at home? Has FDI in the CEECs region been redirected away
from similarly attractive countries, such as Spain and Portugal? The answer to the first
question appears to be negative: exports and FDI seem to go hand in hand as far as German
investment is concerned; furthermore, a complementarity relationship is detected for the
‘electrical machinery’ sector between exports and FDI in the CC3.
Concerning the second question, and taking into account the level of available sectoral
disaggregation, no redirection appears between FDI going to Spain and Portugal and that
going to the CC3. In particular, a reinsuring result is that no redirection appears in the motor-
vehicle sector, in contrast to what is often heard. German investors seem to have quickly
taken the advantage of moving motor-vehicle plants into the CC3, but without reducing the
amount of investment that was already going to Spain and Portugal in the same sector.
A more general result is that FDI in the CC3 is mainly concentrated in the manufacturing
sector, while German investors in the EU are more attracted by services. This preference for
manufacturing is also visible in Spain and Portugal though, which may confirm the
impression that the two groups of countries share a similar structure of ‘attractiveness’ across
sectors. However, from an analytical point of view, the existence of this similarity does not
seem to cause great competition between the two groups of countries. From a ‘political’ point
of view, this similarity should not be the basis for all those who try to prevent the integration
process of the CEECs in the EU; on the contrary, economic integration is inevitable the more
the CCs develop and close the gap between them and the EU countries, as Spain and Portugal
did, following their own accession.
Future improvements of the paper include, from the data viewpoint, the extension of the time-
series, up to 1998; exploration of other definitions of ‘relative factor endowments’, for
example by taking the actual capital/labour ratio, or skilled labour over total employment, as
far as economic concepts are concerned; and finally – from the econometric viewpoint – by
adopting a dummy variable transformation advocated by Suits (1984), whereby the
interpretation of the dummy coefficients on the sectors becomes much more direct than
having to choose a baseline.FRANCESCA DI MAURO
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ANNEX
Data source: ‘International Capital Links’, Special Publication No.10 Deutsche Bundesbank, various
issues (also on http://www.bundesbank.de ).
Data definition: German outward FDI stock (Classification: NACE Rev. 1).
Treatment of zero values: According to the methodological notes of the Bundesbank publication, zero
values mean less than 0.5 but more than nil, hence I replaced them by 0.25, the average value between
0 and 0.5, and kept the observation.
List of host countries included in the database:  Argentina, Australia and New Zealand, Austria,
Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Hong Kong, Hungary, India,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal,
Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, UK, US.22
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